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Caste and Democracy: The Politics of Exclusion 
and Inclusion1 
D. L. Sheth 
Caste is the most intensively and widely studied South Asian institution and there is 
no need to reiterate the established wisdom here. I however wish to focus on, rather 
attempt to reformulate, some propositions on caste in terms that can facilitate a 
more direct and precise understanding of the contemporary structures of social 
exclusion in India. Before we proceed with this exercise two important, even if 
obvious, points need to be underlined. First, while many new forms of exclusion are 
indeed structurally integral to the caste system, there also are those unrelated to 
caste as well as the ones representing a combination of caste and non-caste ele-
ments. Second, in making of a social policy for combating exclusion, it is crucial to 
take account of both, the changed political-cultural context of exclusion (modernity, 
nation-state and democracy) and the ideological and structural changes that have 
occurred in the caste-system itself (Sheth 2002). 
I. Social exclusion, Issues of theory and policy 
Much of the thinking (and policy-making) on the issue of social exclusion in India is 
informed by the conventional (comparative-sociological) theory of caste. Since this 
theory views caste primarily as a hierarchy of statuses, a stratificatory system pecu-
liar to a traditional society (Dumont 1980) its relationship with contemporary 
structures of exclusion prevailing in the modern, national societies has remained 
underexplored. Consequently, social exclusion in India (a ›modernising‹, traditional 
society) is almost unidimensionally problematised in terms of status-inequality, a 
hierarchical form persisting obstinately from the past in the face of modernity 
(Dumont). It is only recently that caste is being seen as a hierarchically patterned 
system of substantially existing communities which struggle and compete for resource 
– social, cultural, political and economic – on the ground; in the process, often 
—————— 
 1  I am grateful to Martin Linkenbach-Fuchs for his gentle prodings and lively discussions in that led 
me to preparing this paper. 
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flaunting the rules of hierarchy and changing statuses assigned to them. (e.g. Desai 
1988; Jaiswal 1998; Quigley 1999; Sheth 1999)  
The social policy however, continues to remain in the grip of the conventional 
theory and identifies victims of social exclusion in terms of their traditional-status 
disabilities. Accordingly, benefits of the policy remain by and large confined to 
members of certain involuntary, hereditary groups located at the bottom of the 
traditional hierarchy (the lower sudras) as well as those defined out of the ›sacred‹, 
ideological frame of social hierarchy, i.e. the outcaste and the aboriginal groups. In 
this almost exclusively status-based and power-neutral conception of social exclu-
sion the other non-status dimensions and forms of exclusion – not sufficiently 
explored in the comparative theory of caste – remain unrecognised by the policy. 
Consequently, exclusions based on gender discrimination, economic poverty, cul-
tural marginalization of religious, linguistic and racial minorities, regional backward-
ness, old age and physical disability have been inadequately addressed. 
It is indeed true that even the above (non-caste) type of social exclusion is ex-
perienced more acutely by those belonging to the lowest rungs of the traditional 
hierarchy. This fact, however, cannot justify the argument – often made in the dis-
course of social justice in India – that all contemporary forms of exclusion are 
symptomatic expressions of the caste system. Put differently, the policy, rooted as it 
is in the conventional theory of caste, has failed to address forms of social exclusion 
resulting from the changes in the traditional stratificatory system – the process in 
which caste is conflated with the other, newer, forms of exclusion. Consequently, 
the policy has remained stuck in the old paradigm that problematises social exclu-
sion generally as an issue of extending political equality and social welfare to the 
traditionally discriminated specific social groups. If this policy goal is realized, it is 
often assumed, the other forms of exclusion will dissolve in the ongoing processes 
of political modernization and nation-building.  
To conclude, the new forms of exclusion even when they conflate with caste, do 
not make much sense to the conventional status theory. This is presumably so be-
cause the new realities of social exclusion, often structurally overlapping with caste, 
do not easily fit the theory’s binary categories of caste versus class, collectivity versus 
individual, hierarchy versus equality and the traditional (South Asian) versus modern 
(Western) society. Social exclusion is then viewed as a persistent feature of the tra-
ditional society, an extreme form of status disability, continuing from the past. The 
theory fails to recognize that status-disability of a caste is structurally linked to its 
collective-power deficiency, and that remedying exclusion is not (and really never 
was) primarily a (social) question of improving ritual status, e.g. through sanskritiza-
tion. The issue of status mobility is, and has always been chiefly a political question, 
i.e., the one of redefining power-relations. 
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Need for a political-social theory of caste: The hitherto unexplored relationship between 
caste and contemporary forms of social exclusion could be better understood if the 
conventional status theory is modified with the help of insights generated by some 
recent (as well as some earlier ones but neglected by the conventional, ritual (reli-
gious) status theorists of caste) theoretical and empirical-historical researches (Klass 1980; 
Desai 1988; Milner 1994; Jaiswal 1998; Quigley 1999; Sheth 1999; Byley 1999; Dirks 
2001; Srinivas 2003) which enable us to view political power as a constitutive principle of 
caste, counteracting and constantly seeking to even undermine its systemic princi-
ple, i.e. status.  
Viewed from the empirical-historical perspective, caste can be seen as a plurality 
of socio-political collectivities which continually struggled, strived, and competed 
for acquiring higher statuses in the society, even as they sought to maintain their 
different cultural identities. Caste has thus been a contested terrain from its incep-
tion in which hegemonic ideologies are being crafted and sought to be institutional-
ised by certain dominant social groups (communities), ensuring generational per-
petuation of their power and control over resources in the society and, in the proc-
ess, ensuring for themselves higher (upper caste) social (ritual) status on a highly 
durable basis. Such dominance (achieved by establishing a near monopoly of power 
and knowledge in the society) has been passively, but constantly, resisted by the 
subjugated communities aspiring to social mobility. Quite a few of these com-
munities however, periodically, forcefully challenged the upper-caste dominance by 
producing counter-ideological discourses and often even forming political alliances 
among themselves. By mobilising military support of their compatriots leaders of 
some such communities even managed to acquire power in form of kingship or 
generally by establishing membership to the ›class of rulers‹ (rajanyas/kshatriyas). In 
such moments of history the lower-status, subjugated groups succeeded in moving 
upward in the ritual hierarchy demonstrating, in the process, the salience of the 
power-principle of caste over the status-principle. 
Thus, by balancing the so far overemphasized (overly determining) principle of 
(ritual) status with that of (political) power, caste can be more concretely conceptu-
alised, firstly, as the institution that has been structuring and maintaining, for centu-
ries, relations of power among different communities. As such, it seeks to legitimise these 
power relations: (a) through systematically dispensing various mixes of economic 
and cultural assets/opportunities and deprivations to different communities and (b) 
through endowing religious/ideological sanctification of such dispensations. Sec-
ondly, being primarily a power system its sacralization and the elaborate mecha-
nisms of rewards and punishments it evolved, did not and could not succeed in 
substantially and permanently incorporating or recasting the cultural and historical 
identities of different communities in terms of hierarchical relations. 
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In sum, if we were to grasp the special nature of exclusion in the South Asian so-
cieties (arising from a peculiar fusion of processes of status-allocation and power-
distribution), it is necessary to focus on the political and historical aspects of caste – 
which enables us to view it as a sacralized power structure – rather than exclusively on 
its desubstantialised structural aspect which confines our view of caste to its being 
an all-time, ideologically (religiously) determined hierarchy of ritual statuses.  
Caste: A Self-reproducing Power Structure 
Evolved over centuries, caste sustained communitarian identities of innumerable 
groups ethnically, culturally and socially distinct from each other and at the same 
time, held these communities together in a vast network of local hierarchies. Com-
munities in different local hierarchies were arranged, normatively uniformly, in an 
ascriptively unequal macro-system of graded exclusion, which was politically, eco-
nomically and epistemically dominated by a few, select communities through ages. 
The graded structure of exclusion was never a permanently fixed arrangement, and 
a fairly frequent upward and downward movement of communities took place 
within and across local hierarchies. However, a large divide always existed between 
communities in the small ruling sector (the dvijas or the twice born) which among 
themselves held virtual monopoly of different types of power (intellectual, political 
and economic) and a vast sector of the numerous other communities (the sudras) 
were ascriptively expected to engage directly in primary production and service 
related activities (Ambedkar 1946). A third and a relatively smaller sector of com-
munities (of the excluded others: a-varna) developed over time at system’s periphery 
as a consequence of persistent and often ruthless enforcement of the principle of 
graded exclusion by the ruling communities. For these communities of the third 
sector, the system functioning on the principle of graded exclusion produced a situa-
tion of an all round, permanent exclusion. They were never formally recognized as a 
part of the system. As such, they were not assigned any specifically defined role or 
work in the system’s production and service domains nor in any other domain – 
thus depriving them of any means of livelihood. (Ambedkar 1948) This systemic 
deprivation of livelihood accompanied by the social, cultural and moral exclusion of 
these communities forced them to live in a perpetual situation of economic and 
moral compulsion and ›adopt‹ means of livelihood involving work that was dis-
carded as ›unclean‹ and degrading by the communities whom the system granted 
one or the other entitlement, ensuring them some kind of a right to work. These 
communities of the third sector being ousted even from graded exclusion, remained 
permanently degraded, leaving them, unlike the other communities, little or no 
scope for upward mobility. 
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The intriguing question is how the caste character of exclusion – a hegemony of a 
few traditionally empowered communities based on graded exclusion, over the rest 
of the society – has survived in the South Asian societies in one form or the other, 
despite the fundamental ideological and structural changes that have occurred over 
a long period through the spread of religions like Islam and Christianity as well as of 
modern secular and egalitarian ideologies, all opposed to the very idea of hierarchy 
based on inherited statuses. It is difficult to deal with this question unless we take 
account of these long surviving, highly adaptive (and hence resilient) structures of 
exclusion.  
Two Faces of Caste 
Two commonly misconceived notions of caste held by policy-makers and often 
even by the analysts, come in the way of understanding its resilient and yet adaptive 
nature: first, that caste is a permanently fixed hierarchy of hereditary groups, second 
that a caste derives its identity almost exclusively from the status it has in the hierar-
chy. In fact caste has another face which is often shrouded in theory, i.e. of a com-
munity. It is important to elaborate and clarify here these two rather different exis-
tences of caste – the hierarchical and communitarian – in order that we understand 
why caste has remained the most resilient among the stratificatory structures. 
Caste as a hierarchy of statuses: Seen in a historical perspective caste, or a caste-like 
structure, is a hierarchy of social forms within which concretely existing groups hold 
statuses, but from which they may move out and occupy other statuses. Thus the 
actual groups to which statuses are attached have always moved up and down in the 
hierarchies, in which process a group could detach itself from a given (born in) 
status and credibly adopt another higher status or may get pushed to a lower one. 
Thus when a group moves in the hierarchy, from one status to another, it inheres 
the power and privilege (or lack of it) of the status it enters. In this sense power and 
privileges are structurally tied to a status and not necessarily to a specific hereditary 
group. It is by resolutely sticking to certain statuses that historically a few groups 
traditionally representing epistemic, political/military and economic power have 
been able to dominate the entire system and maintain a degree of legitimacy of their 
power. This relationship between the group/community and status is although 
sustained by the ideology of hereditary virtues fixing permanent ritual distances 
among groups, historically there have been continuous countervailing movements 
to caste, which periodically resulted in several groups moving out of their born-in 
statuses and getting into new statuses. In the past the movements like Jainism, Bud-
dhism, Tantricism and Bhakti caused such reshuffling of groups across statuses, in 
the ongoing hierarchal system. Yet, despite formidable ideological challenges and 
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some structural impacts they made on it, by and large, traditionally dominating 
groups retained power in the system, usually by redefining, often relaxing the rules 
which maintained ritual distances and prevented choices. But it is only in the mo-
dern times that both ideological and structural challenges have converged, with 
implications for imploding the old hierarchical structure. These changes have, 
however, yet not appreciably reduced the power of the old status groups in the 
society. They have only made it unnecessary for the ruling status-groups to sustain 
and justify their claims to power in ritual or ascriptive terms; insofar as the intrinsic 
value of status survives in the society, the traditional status-groups can discard the 
old ideological terms and use new ones for validating their continuing status-power. 
Caste as a Network of Ethnic Communities 
It is important to note that even in the traditional hierarchy-determined system of 
social hegemony the included and excluded communities did not exist in a bi-polar 
structure of power. The graded structure of exclusion also linked communities to 
each other in such a manner that caste could also be seen as a graded structure of 
inclusion in which power percolated to every community irrespective of its location 
in the hierarchy. This caused each community to experience a sense of social sali-
ence in the system. Put in more concrete terms, despite being tied in a structure of 
hierarchy a community at each level, except probably at the bottom most level, 
enjoyed a degree of dominance over some others below it. The dominance was 
however maintained not just through exercise of power but also by a system of 
mutual obligation and dependence among the communities. While this system never 
pretended to establish one, culturally homogenized political community, it did sus-
tain a common symbolic meaning system making communications possible across 
types of communities (representing denominational, ethnic, linguistic, and occupa-
tional-cultural differences) and levels of hierarchy. No community had a cultural 
identity autonomous of the other, it was always expressed in relational terms, where a 
particular identity could not be self-perceived or perceived by others in terms inde-
pendent and underivable from those defining the systemic whole.  
It will thus be an overly simplified view of the traditional caste system, if it holds 
that in it the distinct and hierarchically ordered communities lived a completely 
localized existence and had their identities constituted by statuses they occupied. In 
the system of graded dominance no community, not even the one at the top, en-
joyed absolute power. Each dominating group was entitled to only one type (intel-
lectual or political or economic) power, which again percolated downward to other 
similar communities. This allowed many communities, despite hierarchical diffe-
rences, to interact with each other in horizontal spaces marked by a degree of mutu-
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ality and cooperation among them. In this system of hierarchy each community was 
simultaneously a status group and an autonomous community in its own right. A 
community also developed some kind of a social capital for itself, ironically, through 
performing specific roles and developing specialized skills and crafts assigned to it 
in the hierarchy. But this contributed also to the growth of social assets for the 
community and imparted it with some especially identifiable psycho-cultural char-
acteristics. These characteristics and assets cumulatively formed a basis of a cultural 
recognition of the community – often in terms independent of its status in the 
social hierarchy – and of its social mobility. All this allowed/encouraged every 
community, irrespective of its location in the hierarchy, to construct its special 
›history‹ and build legends justifying its autonomous existence in a non-hierarchical, 
horizontal space and the place of pride it held in the society.  
A community also maintained a degree of political and social governance for it-
self, and evolved mechanisms and procedures for settlements of disputes within it 
and of resolving conflicts vis-à-vis the other communities. The political authority of 
the state wherever and in whatever form it existed (King, an oligarchy, ruling coun-
cil, a panchayat) was usually negatively defined as the one charged with preventing 
major transgressions or defiance of the generally and conventionally recognized 
social and economic codes of the system as a whole. It also sought to prevent the 
use of raw power or unsanctioned dominance by one community over the other. In 
short, operating within the rules of an ascriptively ordered hierarchy, (rather by 
constantly bending these rules) the communities were able to find large social and 
economic spaces, and acquire distinctive cultural identities for themselves. 
To conclude, in this hierarchically ordered world of communities, contrary to 
common belief, no community was expected to live, or it really lived, with a hierar-
chically defined (caste) unidimensional identity. Probably that made it possible for 
the system to constantly accommodate immigrant and invading ethnic groups as 
well as the ever arising new occupational groups, in the system’s flexible hierarchy. 
It even made it possible for some of them to move vertically upward in the hierar-
chy and be structurally a part of the ruling status groups. To put it differently, the 
communities did not live in a prison house of identities; just as they detached and 
reattached themselves with statuses, they also discarded the old and donned new 
identities, through their movements in time and space. 
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II. Caste and Democratic Politics2 
For some two decades after Independence, the political discourse on caste was 
dominated by left-radical parties and liberal-modernist intellectuals who saw, rather 
simplistically, changes in the caste system in linear terms, i.e., changes as suggestive 
of its transformation into a system of polarized economic classes. In believing so, 
they ignored the fact that while caste had lost its significance as a ritual-status group 
it survived as a ›community‹, seeking alliances with other similar communities with 
whom it shared commonality of political interest and consciousness. Consequently, 
political parties of the Left, both the communist and the socialist, by and large, 
sought to articulate political issues and devise strategies of mobilizing electoral 
support in terms of economic interests which in their view divided the social classes 
in India. In the event, although these parties could credibly claim to represent the 
poorer strata and they even occupied some significant political spaces in opposition 
to the Congress party at the time of Independence, they failed to expand their 
electoral support in any significant measure for decades after Independence. 
Politicisation of Caste  
Put simply, competitive politics required that a political party seeking wider electoral 
bases must view castes neither as a pure category of ›interest‹ nor of ›identity‹. The 
involvement of castes in politics fused ›interest‹ and ›identity‹ in such a manner that 
a number of castes could share common interests and identity in the form of larger 
social-political conglomerates. The process was of politicization of castes, which by 
incorporating castes in competitive politics reorganized and recast the elements of 
both hierarchy and separation among castes in larger social collectivities. These new 
collectivities did not resemble the varna categories or any thing like a polarized class-
structure in politics. The emergence of these socio-political entities in Indian poli-
tics defied the convental categories of political analysis, i.e., class analysis vs. caste 
analysis. The singular impact of competitive democratic politics on the caste system 
thus was that it delegitimized the old hierarchical relations among castes, facilitating 
new, horizontal power relations among them. 
Congress Dominance: First Phase of Politicization: The process of politicization of 
castes acquired a great deal of sophistication in the politics of the Congress party, 
which scrupulously avoided taking any theoretical-ideological position on the issue 
of caste versus class. The Congress party, being politically aware of the change in 
the agrarian context, saw castes as socio-economic entities seeking new identities 
—————— 
 2  This section heavily borrows from my earlier work, Secularisation of Caste (Sheth 1999). 
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through politics in the place of the old identities derived from their traditional status 
in the ritual hierarchy. Thus, by relying on the caste calculus for its electoral politics 
and, at the same time, articulating political issues in terms of economic development 
and national integration, the Congress was able to evolve durable electoral bases 
across castes and to maintain its image as the only and truly national party. This 
winning combination of ›caste politics‹ and ›nationalist ideology‹ secured for the 
Congress Party a dominant position in Indian politics for nearly three decades after 
Independence. The Congress party rarely used such dichotomies as upper-castes vs. 
lower castes or the capitalists vs. working class in its political discourse. Its politics 
was largely addressed to linking vertically the rule of the newly emergent upper-
caste and English speaking – ›national elite‹ to lower-caste support. And the ideol-
ogy used for legitimation of this vertical social linkage in politics was neither class-
ideology nor caste-ideology; the key concept was ›nation-building‹. 
The Congress party projected its politics and programmes at the national level as 
representing ›national aspirations‹ of the Indian people. At the regional levels, the 
party consolidated its social base by endorsing the power of the numerically strong 
and upwardly mobile dominant, but traditionally of lower status, castes of land-
owing peasants e.g., the Marathas in Maharashtra, the Reddys in Andhra, the Pati-
dars in Gujarat, the Jats in Uttar Pradesh and so on. In the process it created pa-
tron-client type of relationships in electoral politics, relationships of unequal but 
reliable exchanges between political patrons – the upper and dominant (intermedi-
ate) castes – and the numerous ›client‹ castes at the bottom of the pile, popularly 
known as the Congress‹ ›vote-banks‹. Thus, in the initial two decades after Inde-
pendence, the hierarchical caste relations were processed politically through elec-
tions. This ensured for the Congress a political consensus across castes, despite the 
fact that it was presided over by the hegemony of a small upper-caste, English-edu-
cated elite in collaboration with the regional social elites belonging by and large to 
the upwardly mobile castes of landed peasants. The latter, however, were often 
viewed by the former, (i.e., the ›national elite‹, with the self-image of modernizers) 
as parochial traditionalists. Still the alliance held. 
This collaboration between the two types of elites, created a new structure of 
representational power in the society, around which grew a small middle-class. This 
class constituted of the upper-caste national elite living in urban areas and the rural 
social elite belonging to the dominant peasant castes as well as those upper caste 
members living in rural areas. The ruling national elites although belonged to the 
upper dwija castes they had become detached from their traditional ritual status and 
functions. They had acquired new interests in the changed (planned) economy, and 
life-styles which came through modern education, non-traditional occupations, and 
a degree of westernization which accompanied this process. The dominant castes of 
the regional elites, still depended more on sanskritization than on ›westernization‹ in 
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their pursuit of upward social mobility. But they encouraged their new generations 
to take to modern, English-medium education and to new professions. In the proc-
ess, despite their sudra origins, but thanks to their acquisition of new power in the 
changed rural economy and politics, several peasant communities succeeded in 
claiming social status equivalent to the middle-class dwijas.  
Consequently, such communities as Patidars, Marathas, Reddys, Kammas, and 
their analogues in different regions were identified with ›upper castes‹, and not with 
›backward castes‹. Acquisition of modern education and interest in the new 
(planned) economy enabled them, like the dwija upper-castes, to claim for them-
selves a new social status and identity, i.e., of the middle class.  
At the same time, the caste identities of both these sections of the ›middle class‹ 
were far from dissolved. They could comfortably own both the upper caste status 
and the middle-class identity as both categories had become concomitant with each 
other. While the alliance between the upper caste national-elite and the dominant-
caste regional elites remained tenuous in politics, they together continued to func-
tion as a new power-group in the larger society. In the formation and functioning of 
this middle-class as a power group of elites the caste had indeed fused with the class 
and status dimension had acquired a pronounced power dimension. But insofar as 
this process of converting traditional status into new power was restricted only to 
the upper rungs in the ritual hierarchy, they sought to use that power in establishing 
their own caste-like hegemony over the rest of the society. It is this nexus between 
the upper traditional status and new power that inhibited the transformative poten-
tials of both modernization and democracy in India. 
This conflation of the traditional status system with the new power system, 
however, worked quite differently for the numerous non-dwija lower castes. In nego-
tiating their way into the new power-system, their traditional low status, contrary to 
what it did for the upper and the intermediate castes, worked as a liability. The 
functions attached to their very low traditional statuses had lost relevance or were 
devalued in the modern occupational system. Moreover, since formal education was 
not mandated for them in the traditional status system, they were slow to take to 
modern education when compared with the upper castes. Nor did they have the 
advantage of inherited wealth as their traditional status had tied them to subsistence 
livelihood patterns of the jajmani system. 
In brief, for the lower castes of small and marginal peasants, artisans, the ex-
untouchables and the numerous tribal communities, their low statuses in the tradi-
tional hierarchy worked negatively for their entry in the modern sector. Whatever 
social capital and economic security they had in the traditional status system was 
wiped out through the modernization process; they no longer enjoyed the protec-
tion that they had in the traditional status system against the arbitrary use of hierar-
chical power by the upper castes. On top of that they had no means or resources to 
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enter the modern sector in any significant way, except becoming its underclass. 
They remained at the bottom rung of both the hierarchies, the sacred and the secu-
lar, of caste and class. 
This did objectively create an elite-mass kind of division in politics, but it still 
did not produce any awareness of polarization of socio-economic classes in the 
society. In any event, it did not create any space for class-based politics. In fact, all 
attempts of the left parties at political mobilization of the numerous lower-castes as 
a class of proletarians did not achieve any significant results either for their electoral 
or revolutionary politics. Neither did their politics, focused as it was on class ideol-
ogy, make much of a dent on Congress-dominated politics marked by the rhetoric 
of national integration and social harmony. In effect, Congress could establish the 
political hegemony of the upper-castes oriented middle-class with the electoral 
consent of the lower-castes! A very peculiar caste-class linkage was thus forged in 
which the upper castes functioned in politics with the self-identity of a class (ruling 
or ›middle‹) and the lower-castes, despite their class-like political aspirations, with 
the consciousness of their separate caste identities. The latter were linked to the 
former in a vertical system of political exchange through the Congress party, rather 
than horizontally with one another. 
Politics of Reservations: Second Phase of Politicization 
It took some three decades after Independence for the lower castes of peasants, 
artisans, the ex-untouchables and the tribals to express their resentment about the 
patron-client relationship that had politically bound them to the Congress party. 
With a growing awareness of their numerical strength and the role it could play in 
achieving their share in political power, their resentment took the form of political 
action and movements. An awareness among the lower castes about using political 
means for upward social mobility and for staking claims as larger social collectivities 
for share in political power had arisen during the colonial period, but it was sub-
dued after Independence, for almost three decades and a half of Congress domi-
nance.  
It was around mid 1970’s that the upper caste hegemony over national politics 
began to be seriously challenged. This was largely due to the social policies of the 
State, particularly that of Reservations (affirmative action). Despite tardy imple-
mentation, toward the end of the 1970’s the Reservations policy that was for long 
in-existence in many states of the Indian union had created a small but significant 
section, in each of the lower caste groups, which had acquired modern education, 
had entered the bureaucracy and other non-traditional occupations. In the process a 
small, but a highly vocal political leadership emerged, from among the lower castes.  
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The process of politicization of castes, however, came to head at the beginning of 
the 1980’s. This was when the Second Commission for Backward Classes (the 
Mandal Commission) proposed to extend reservations in jobs and educational seats 
to the Other Backward Classes (i.e., to castes of lower peasantry and artisans) in all 
states and union territories and at the central Government level. This proposal was 
stoutly opposed by sections of the upper and the intermediate castes who by then 
were largely ensconced in the middle-class. They saw the newly politicized lower 
castes forcing their way into the middle class (particularly into white-collar jobs), 
that too not through open competition but on ›caste-based‹ reservations. This cre-
ated a confrontation of interest between the upper and intermediate castes on the 
one hand and the lower castes on the other. But, it led to a resurgence of lower 
castes in national politics. This resurgent politics, guided by lower-caste aspirations 
to enter the middle class, was pejoratively derided as the ›Mandalization of politics‹ 
by the English-educated elite. The so called Mandalized politics, an euphemism for 
politicization of lower castes, has since resulted in radically altering the social bases 
of politics in India.  
Firstly, the Congress party-dominated politics of social consensus, presided over 
by the hegemony of an upper-caste, English-educated elite came to an end. The 
Congress organization could no longer function as the system of vertical manage-
ment of region-caste factions. The elite at the top could not accommodate the ever 
increasing claims and pressures from below, by different sections of the lower 
castes, for their share in power. Since mid-1970’s through the 1980’s, large sections 
of the lower strata of social groups abandoned the Congress and constituted them-
selves into shifting alliances of their own separate political parties. The vertical 
arrangement of the region-caste factions that the Congress had perfected just col-
lapsed. The national parties – the Congress, the BJP, and the Communist parties 
alike – had now to negotiate for political support directly with the social-political 
collectivities of the Other Backward Castes (OBCs) the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and 
Scheduled Tribes (STs) or with the regional-caste parties constituted by them. 
Secondly, the categories of the OBCs, SCs and the STs, expressly devised for 
the administrative purpose of implementing the Reservations policy, perhaps as an 
unintended consequence, acquired a strong social and political content and surfaced 
as new social formations in the macro-stratificatory system. They now operated in 
politics with the self-consciousness of socio-economic groups. Not content with 
proxy-representations by the upper caste, middle class elites, they wanted political 
power for themselves. Politics now became a contest for representation among 
horizontal power groups, representing social collectivises as identified by the policy 
of Reservations. These groups began to bargain with different existing parties or 
formed their own new parties. Whatever survived of the hierarchical dimension of 
the traditional stratificatory system in politics was thus effectively horizontalized.  
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Thirdly, the ›Mandalized politics‹ by generating aspirations among the lower castes 
to attain ›middle class‹ status and lifestyles prevented the process of class polariza-
tion. This politics created new compulsions in the social arena. The old middle-
class, dominated by the upper and intermediate castes, was now compelled to admit 
expansion beyond itself and make spaces, even if grudgingly, for different sections 
of the lower castes. At the same time, lower castes while forming coalitions in poli-
tics, began to compete among themselves intensely at the social level for an entry 
into the growing middle-class.  
In sum, the state policy of affirmative action gave a big impetus to the process 
of politicization of castes (as well as to de-ritualization of inter-caste relations). The 
policy itself, by providing special educational and occupational opportunities to 
members of the numerous lower castes, converted their traditional disability of low 
ritual status into an asset for acquiring new means for upward social mobility. What 
politicization of castes has thus done, along with the spread of urbanization and 
industrialization, is to have contributed to the emergence of a new type of stratifi-
catory system in which the old middle-class has not only expanded in numbers, but 
has begun to acquire new social and political characteristics. 
Classization of Caste 
›Classization‹ is a problematic, and admittedly an inelegant concept used for de-
scribing certain type of changes in caste. As a category derived from the conven-
tional ›class analysis‹ it articulates the issue of change in linear and dichotomous 
terms, i.e., how, is caste transforming itself into a polarized structure of economic 
classes? Just as the role of status and other ›non-class‹ elements (e.g., gender, ethnic-
ity etc.) is routinely ignored in analyses of class in the Western society, ›Class analy-
sis‹ in India undermines the role of ›caste‹ elements in class and vice versa. At the 
other end the spectrum are scholars devoted to ›caste-analysis‹; they have little use 
for a concept like ›classization‹. Accustomed to viewing caste as a local hierarchy 
and to interpreting changes in it, in terms of the caste system’s own ideology and 
rules, they view class elements in caste, (e.g., the role of modern education, occupa-
tional mobility, economic and political power, etc.) as elements extraneous to the 
caste system; which, it, of course, incorporates and recast them in its own image to 
maintain its systemic continuity. 
 S H E T H :  C A S T E  A N D  D E M O C R A C Y  1097  
 
Emergence of a New Middle-Class 
All these changes have imparted a structural substantiality to the macro-stratifica-
tory system of a kind it did not have in the past. In absence of a centralized polity, 
the system functioned super structurally as an ideology of varna hierarchy. Lacking 
structural substance, it served as a »common social language« and supplied norma-
tive categories of legitimation of statuses to various local, substantive hierarchies of 
jatis. But after India became a pan-Indian political entity governed by a liberal de-
mocratic State, as we saw earlier, new social formations – each comprising a num-
ber of jatis, often across ritual hierarchies and religious communities – emerged at 
the regional and all-India levels. Deriving its nomenclature from the official classifi-
cation devised by the State in the course of implementing its policy of affirmative 
action (Reservations), the new formations began to be identified as: the forward or 
the ›upper castes‹, the backward castes (OBCs), the dalits or Scheduled Castes (SCs) 
and the tribals or the Scheduled Tribes (STs).  
Unlike status groups of the caste system, the new social formations function as 
relatively loose and open-ended entities, competing with each other for political 
power. In this competition, members of the upper-caste formation have available to 
them the resources of their erstwhile traditional higher status and those of lower-caste 
formations have the advantages accruing to them from the State’s policy of af-
firmative action. Thus, the emergent stratificatory system represents a kind of fu-
sion between the old status system and the new power system. Put differently, the 
ritual hierarchy of closed status groups has transformed into a fairly open and fluid 
system of social stratification.  
This system is in making; it cannot be described either in caste terms or in pure 
class terms. However, the salience of one category in this newly emergent stratifi-
catory system has become visible in recent years. It can be characterized as the ›new 
middle class‹: ›New‹ because its emergence is directly traceable to the disintegration 
of the caste system, this has made it socially much more diversified compared to the 
old, upper-caste oriented middle-class that existed at the time of Independence. 
Moreover, high status in the traditional hierarchy worked implicitly as a criterion for 
entry into the ›old‹ middle-class, and ›sanskritized‹ life-styles constituted its cultural 
syndrome. Both rituality and sanskritization have virtually lost their relevance in the 
formation of the ›new‹ middle-class. Membership of today’s middle-class is associ-
ated with new life-styles (modern consumption patterns), ownership of certain 
economic assets and the self-consciousness of belonging to the ›middle-class‹. As such, 
it is open to members of different castes – which have acquired modern education, 
taken to non-traditional occupations and/or command higher incomes and the 
political power – to enter this ›middle-class‹.  
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And yet, the ›new middle class‹ cannot be seen as constituting a pure class category – 
a construct which in fact is a theoretical fiction. It carries some elements of caste 
within it, in so far as entry of an individual in the middle-class is facilitated by the 
collective political and economic resources of his/her caste. For example, upper-
caste individuals entering the middle class have at their disposal the resources that 
were attached to the status of their caste in the traditional hierarchy. Similarly for 
lower caste members, lacking in traditional status resources, their entry into the 
›middle-class‹ is facilitated by the modern-legal provisions like affirmative action to 
which they are entitled by virtue of their low traditional status. It seems the Indian 
›middle class‹ will continue to carry caste elements within it, to the extent that mod-
ern status aspirations are pursued, and the possibility of their realization is seen, by 
individuals in terms of the castes to which they belong.  
To conclude, democratic politics has subjected caste to a continuous process of 
secularization. This process has transformed caste along the dimensions of de-ritu-
alization, politicization and classization, with the result that caste has been reduced, 
to a kinship-based micro-community. But at the some time its members have been 
acquiring new structural locations and identities which are derived from the new 
categories of stratification premised on a different set of principles than those of the 
ritual hierarchy. By thus forming themselves into larger horizontal social groups, 
members of different castes are now increasingly competing for entry into the ›mid-
dle class‹. The result is, members of the lower castes have entered the middle class 
in sizeable numbers. This has begun to change the character and composition of the 
old, pre-Independence, middle-class which was constituted almost entirely by a 
small English-educated upper-caste elite.  
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